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EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
Susan A. Bandes†
In response to Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk 
Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (2008). 
 Are emotions subversive of reason or essential constituents 
of it?  This is the broad question posed by Dan Kahan in Two 
Concepts of Emotion in Risk Regulation,1 a welcome addition to 
his ongoing inquiry into how emotional appraisals of value 
influence decision making.  Much of Kahan’s recent work has 
focused on a particular aspect of policymaking:  the study of 
risk perception.  Two Conceptions continues a useful exchange 
between Kahan and Cass Sunstein2 about the differences between 
                                                     
† Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of 
Law; Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School, 2007-
2008.  I am indebted to Andy Koppelman, Carol Sanger, Stephen 
Siegel, and Cass Sunstein for their insightful comments, and to 
Robert Brooks and Laura DeMichael, of the University of Chicago 
Law School Class of 2009, for their excellent research 
assistance. 
1 Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 
156 U. Pa. L. Rev 741 (2008). 
2 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear:  Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Laws of 
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their prominent approaches to risk regulation:  Kahan’s cultural 
cognition approach3 and Sunstein’s heuristics and biases 
approach, which focuses on the cognitive mechanisms that shape 
perceptions about risk.4  Kahan illuminates the issues at stake 
with his customary passion and clarity.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Fear].  The other principal texts of the Kahan/Sunstein 
interchange are Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A 
Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 
(2006) (reviewing Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra), and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Misfearing:  A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Misfearing] (replying to Kahan et al., 
supra). 
3 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 149 (2006); Kahan et al., 
supra note 2, at 1072. 
4 According to Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel 
Kahneman, “The core idea of the heuristics and biases program is 
that judgment under uncertainty is often based on a limited 
number of simplifying heuristics rather than more formal and 
extensive algorithmic processing.”  Thomas Gilovich et al., 
Preface to Heuristics and Biases:  The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, at xv, xv (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Heuristics and Biases]. 
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 A major contribution of Kahan’s work has been its insight 
into the pervasiveness of emotional influences on the decision-
making process.  The recognition that emotion pervades decision 
making raises a difficult normative question:  how to 
distinguish the influences that contribute to good judgment from 
those that distort judgment.  This normative question in turn 
gives rise to a difficult practical question:  how to address 
the influences that cause distortion.  In this brief Response, I 
argue that tackling this evaluative task requires avoiding 
mirror impulses:  emotions should neither be privileged as 
inherently desirable nor marginalized as inherently irrational.  
They should be judged based on what they contribute to the 
cognitive task at hand. 
 The task at hand, as the Kahan/Sunstein debate defines it, 
is determining how government should regulate risk.  In 
exploring the question of how this task is best approached, I 
will also raise a question about how it is defined.  I suggest 
that the very act of framing issues of government policy in 
terms of risk regulation reflects certain assumptions about how 
issues present themselves and what sorts of cognitive processes 
might be required to address them. 
 I.  Cognitive Process:  Distinguishing the Mechanism from 
the Interfering Factors 
 3
 Dan Kahan’s important message is that emotion operates at a 
much more basic and pervasive level than is commonly thought.  I 
share this view.5  Although emotions are often portrayed as 
bursts of feeling that intrude upon rational thought from time 
to time, this view is out of step with current findings across a 
range of disciplines.  Current theorists tend to view emotions 
as processes rather than fixed states--as pervasive influences 
on the way we appraise and react to stimuli.6  In this account, 
emotions help us to interpret, organize, and prioritize the 
information that bombards us.  We categorize this information 
based on assumptions about what is to be feared, who is to be 
trusted, and who is within our circle of care and compassion.  
We organize it into a coherent account of human behavior and 
                                                     
5 Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to The Passions of Law 1, 1-2 
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
6 There is no single overarching definition of emotion.  As the 
philosopher Robert Solomon observed, “‘Emotion’ is a 
heterogeneous category that encompasses a wide variety of 
significant psychological phenomena.”  Robert C. Solomon, What 
Is an Emotion?, Emotion Researcher (Int’l Soc’y for Res. on 
Emotion, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Spring 2007, at 5. 
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causality.7  We cannot function without creating markers of 
saliency and value, and our emotions aid us in identifying which 
information is especially salient,8 valuable, or urgent--or 
indeed, worthy of notice or action at all.9  In short, emotions 
help shape the heuristic and other cognitive tools that are 
essential to the continuing task of information processing.10  
                                                     
7 See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas et al., Responding to the Social 
World:  Explicit and Implicit Processes in Social Judgments, in 
Social Judgments:  Implicit and Explicit Processes 1, 7-8 
(Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Social 
Judgments]) (discussing various theories about the dynamics of 
social judgment). 
8 For a discussion of recent neuroscientific studies of how the 
brain selectively processes portions of its inputs based on 
measures of saliency, see Shih-Cheng Yen & Leif H. Finkel, 
Salience, in 4 Encyclopedia of the Human Brain 237 (V.S. 
Ramachandran ed., 2002). 
9 See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error:  Emotion, Reason, and 
the Human Brain 173-75 (1994) (describing the “somatic marker” 
theory, one influential explanation of how the brain highlights 
and prioritizes information). 
10 See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas & Rebekah East, Affective 
Influences on Social Judgments and Decisions:  Implicit and 
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These devices may steer us wrong, or they may transmute into 
biases, but they are an essential part of our cognitive 
apparatus.  
 Whether a cognitive tool steers us wrong depends on the 
purpose it is meant to serve.  For example, in much simpler 
times, fear of strangers or tribal loyalty might have been 
adequate ways of defining who we should avoid or who we should 
trust.  Such heuristics in a complex, heterogeneous world easily 
transmute into unhelpful and even pernicious biases.  Thus, in 
order to consider what role individual emotions--and the 
judgments they help shape--ought to play in governmental 
policymaking,11 we need a normative theory of how government 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Explicit Processes, in Social Judgments, supra note 7, at 198-
221. 
11 As Kahan and Sunstein both recognize, the question of how 
people would address risk individually differs from the question 
of how they would like their government to address collective 
risks.  The latter question is the relevant one for the topic at 
hand.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 261 
(1997) (distinguishing the preferences people hold as private 
consumers from their collective political judgments); and Kahan 
et al., supra note 2, at 1106 (raising ambiguity between 
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ought to govern and what role individual citizens ought to play 
in governance.   
 Kahan and Sunstein are in substantial agreement that the 
ultimate goal is a deliberative democracy that advances the 
ideals of transparency, autonomy, and robust debate among those 
with diverse perspectives; enables the conditions for informed 
choice; and respects the considered values of the citizenry.12  
Their disagreements center on determining how those values 
should be evaluated and what weight they should be accorded in 
the formation of policy.  More specifically, Kahan and Sunstein 
part company on how laypeople understand and weigh risks, and on 
the deference government should accord their perceptions.  I 
will consider the implications of both scholars’ conceptions of 
emotion for the questions at hand. 
II.  Emotion, Value, Belief 
 Dan Kahan has long argued that emotion plays an important 
role in the way people arrive at their beliefs13 (for example, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
measures of individual preferences and individual visions of a 
good society). 
12 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 13-14; Kahan et al., 
supra note 2, at 1072. 
13 The definitional issues posed by interdisciplinary discourse 
on these issues are daunting.  Many of the relevant terms 
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their positions on gun control, capital punishment, or 
abortion).  He argues as a normative matter that emotions 
reflect values, that governmental policy should to some extent 
reflect the values of the citizenry, and that therefore the 
emotions of individuals are entitled to some weight in 
policymaking.  He argues, as a practical matter, that in order 
to communicate with and perhaps even persuade people of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
describing feeling, attitude, and belief have no accepted 
meaning, are used interchangeably, or have contested meanings.  
See, e.g., Bertram Gawronski, Editorial:  Attitudes Can Be 
Measured!  But What Is an Attitude?, 25 Soc. Cognition 573, 574 
(2007).  The terms “emotion” and “affect” are sometimes used 
interchangeably and sometimes to connote different concepts.  
Neither has a single accepted meaning.  In this Response, I will 
use them interchangeably.  As to the term “values,” Kahan tends 
to use this term, like the phrase “cultural worldview,” to 
connote a general orientation, such as an egalitarian or 
individualistic ethic.  See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, 
at 150.  But cf. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1112.  
The meaning of the term “values” will be a central focus of this 
Response.  As to the term “beliefs,” Kahan uses it to describe 
positions on issues, such as gun control and the death penalty.  
Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, at 150. 
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disparate beliefs, it is necessary to address the emotions that 
animate those beliefs.14   
 Like Kahan, I believe that emotional influences cannot be 
easily cabined; and, moreover, that while they do not always 
help produce the optimal answer, they cannot be dismissed as 
mere impediments to fruitful thought.  As a practical matter, it 
also follows, as Kahan argues, that if we want to channel or 
regulate emotions, we first must acknowledge them.  In Antonio 
Damasio’s words, “taking stock of the pervasive role of feelings 
may give us a chance of enhancing their positive effects and 
reducing their potential harm.”15  
 But Kahan’s claim that values reflect emotions and are 
therefore entitled to normative weight bears further scrutiny.  
Emotion is an integral part of normative judgment, but emotions 
are not entitled to a priori normative weight in determining the 
shape of policy.  Kahan’s work sheds much light on the social 
dynamics of belief formation, but it tends to treat values as 
inherently good rather than interrogating their content or their 
susceptibility to change.  He views emotion “as a perceptive 
faculty uniquely suited to discerning what stance toward risk 
                                                     
14 Kahan, supra note 1, at 761-66. 
15 Damasio, supra note 9, at 246. 
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best coheres with a person’s values.”16  The values (or cultural 
worldviews) themselves, in this account, are stable and 
reflective, rather than context sensitive.  They are trait-like 
attributes,17 like an “egalitarian” ethic or “individualistic” 
values.18
 I suggest that value and fact have a more fluid and 
mutually constitutive relationship.  We construct the world in 
light of assumptions about how it ought to work, but what we 
perceive helps shape what we feel and what we value.  Neither 
emotion nor value is inert; both shape and are shaped by social 
milieu.  For example, the ongoing national debate in the wake of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks has caused many people to 
reevaluate not just their beliefs about issues like racial 
profiling and torture, but also their underlying values about 
the balance between civil liberty and security.  Our fears may 
influence us to condone indefinite detention or harsh 
interrogation; our capacity for empathy and compassion might 
                                                     
16 Kahan, supra note 1, at 744. 
17 Of course, for purposes of empirical research, any proxy for 
difficult-to-measure attributes like “values” or “attitudes” 
will involve some tradeoffs between complexity and workability. 
18 See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, at 153-54 (discussing 
work by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky). 
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lead us to be concerned about the fate of those detained or 
outraged about our government’s role in the abuse of prisoners.  
People interpret factual data in light of their values; but 
ideally their values also evolve in response to understandings 
of the data that emerge as part of the social process of 
deliberation.19
III.  The Challenges of Empirical and Normative Complexity 
 Cass Sunstein’s risk regulation scholarship is centrally 
concerned with evaluating perceptions of risk and the weight 
those perceptions should be accorded in policymaking.  His work 
within the field of heuristics and biases has made a major 
contribution to our understanding of the challenges posed by the 
vast gap between information about risk and the individual’s 
ability to process it.  As Sunstein’s scholarship amply 
demonstrates, people often fear things that are not particularly 
likely to happen and minimize much more likely hazards.  They 
may fear nuclear power and embrace sunbathing, without paying 
                                                     
19 See generally Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social 
Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Moral Psychology, in 2 
Moral Psychology (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed.) (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=855164 (arguing that moral 
judgment is a social process).  
 11
careful attention to the actual risks posed by either one.20  
 Although Sunstein’s work tends to focus on fear,21 this 
point can be made regarding other emotions and emotional 
capacities as well.  For example, empathy may also drive people 
to take measures that seem disproportionate to the harm caused.  
It has been twenty years since the toddler Jessica McClure fell 
into a well in her backyard and was trapped there for fifty-
eight hours.  The nation was transfixed by the rescue effort and 
an outpouring of support followed; there are reports that on her 
twenty-fifth birthday McClure will come into a million dollar 
trust fund contributed by “well-wishers.”22  Also in 1987, 
however, one thousand people died in an earthquake in Ecuador--
                                                     
20 Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 86. 
21 And more recently, indignation.  See generally Daniel Kahneman 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation:  Psychology, Politics, Law 
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 346, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1002707. 
22 David Randall, From Girl Trapped in a Well to Millionaire:  
The Remarkable Jessica McClure, Independent, Oct. 14, 2007, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/from-girl-
trapped-in-a-well-to-millionaire-the-remarkable-jessica-mcclure-
396850.html. 
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an event that elicited far less attention and emotion in the 
United States at the time and is likely less remembered today 
than the McClure incident.   
 Empathy is an essential capacity for social beings,23 and an 
essential part of effective moral judgment--the kind that leads 
us to be concerned not only about a little girl in Texas, but 
also about the loss of life in countries far away.  By itself, 
empathy provides no metric for making difficult allocational 
decisions24--and it may pull us in directions that do not reflect 
our best collective judgment.25  Thus it is certainly right that 
                                                     
23 See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells That Read Minds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
10, 2006, at F1 (discussing the discovery of “mirror neurons,” 
which allow us to understand the “actions, intentions and 
emotions of others . . . [b]y feeling, not by thinking” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
24 See Susan A. Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact 
Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 379-82 (1996) (arguing that 
empathy is a capacity that does not necessarily lead to 
normatively desirable actions). 
25 See, e.g., EurekAlert, How Do We Stop Genocide When We Begin 
To Lose Interest After the First Victim? (Feb. 15, 2007), 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-02/uoo-hdw021207.php 
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government should not simply reflect individual fears and 
empathies; that it needs expert advice; that its role is to take 
a broader view of the common welfare; and that sometimes it 
needs to model and encourage values, not merely reflect them.  
Nevertheless, although empathy cannot provide a metric, it is 
one of a range of emotions that are always part of the calculus.  
There is no “correct” metric for governmental obligation, and 
there exists no rational calculus uninfluenced by loyalty, 
compassion, and affect-based judgments of need and desert. 
 Government policy should not simply reflect emotion, but 
emotion per se is not the problem.  The challenge is to 
encourage the helpful emotions, and discourage, educate, or 
cabin the unhelpful ones.  Sunstein believes that individual 
values should carry some weight in government policy.  However, 
he assumes a clearly discernible line between values and facts 
and argues that mistakes of fact are entitled to no deference.26  
He suggests that one solution to the prevalent problems of 
factual error is to delegate certain risk regulation issues to 
experts.  As Kahan persuasively argues, values and facts are not 
easily disentangled--by either ordinary citizens or experts.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
(reporting on Paul Slovic’s study of moral intuition and its 
limitations in motivating responses to genocide). 
26 See Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1123-25. 
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Therefore it is not easy--and not necessarily desirable--to give 
weight to judgments about the former and not the latter.  This 
debate about the value/fact distinction is critical to the 
question of risk regulation. 
IV.  Judgments of Value and Judgments of Fact 
 The heuristics and biases model on which Sunstein relies 
regards heuristics as a compromise--a substitute (albeit one 
that usually works quite well) for a more deliberative, 
accurate, and reliable reasoning process.  If this view is 
correct, it makes sense to be very cautious about according 
normative weight to beliefs that are the product of--or are 
unduly influenced by--these substitute processes and to prefer 
the conclusions reached by those with more time and better 
information.  However, this view appears to derive from the 
heuristics and biases model’s origins as a corrective to (not a 
challenge to) the rational actor model of economic behavior,27 
and has mainly been tested in situations requiring judgments 
about quantifiable, measurable phenomena--such as judgments that 
                                                     
27 See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction--Heuristics 
and Biases:  Then and Now, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 
4, at 1-3 (offering a historical overview). 
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rely solely on a calculation of probabilities.28  But current 
heuristics and biases scholarship has moved beyond the study of 
computational processes to address questions about governmental 
policy that are both empirically and normatively complex29 and 
that have no definitive, value-neutral answers.  Distinguishing 
helpful heuristics from unhelpful biases requires examining 
particular emotional influences on particular judgmental tasks 
and making a normative decision about whether they advance or 
distort judgment.  These evaluations may differ depending on 
                                                     
28 See id. at 17 (referring to the “computations of similarity 
and availability that were the basis of the original research in 
this tradition”).  See also the summaries of research in Steven 
A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in Heuristics and Biases, 
supra note 4, at 379-96, and Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. 
West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:  Implications for the 
Rationality Debate?, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 4, at 
421-40.  
29 See Forgas et al., supra note 7, at 9-10 (“[J]udgmental 
heuristics or shortcuts do serve a functional purpose, even if 
their operation can sometimes produce normatively questionable 
outcomes, especially in . . . highly manipulated and 
impoverished experimental situations . . . .”). 
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whether the reasoning is purely computational or involves more 
complex social judgments.30  
 Although Sunstein and other scholars writing about these 
issues address the role of values and other factors complicating 
the rational actor model, the heuristics and biases model on 
which they rely still regards affect-free rationality as the 
normative baseline and emotion-influenced judgments as products 
                                                     
30 Current research suggests that emotions may play a far smaller 
role in arriving at “[j]udgments that do not rely on memory-
based information,” and instead rely on “abstract and 
uninvolving stimulus materials, such as the word lists typically 
preferred by cognitive researchers.”  Emotions play a larger 
role in constructive judgment situations that require “active 
elaboration and transformation of the available stimulus 
information.”  Forgas & East, supra note 10, at 204; see also 
William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland, The Neural 
Mechanisms of Moral Cognition:  A Multiple-Aspect Approach to 
Moral Judgment and Decision-Making, 18 Biology & Phil. 169, 188 
(2003) (“Moral judgments tell us what we ought to think so that 
we know what to do.  Isolating the doing from the knowing via an 
artificial experimental regimen can remove the directedness of 
moral cognition.”). 
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of normative bias.31  As Kahan describes, in this model, affect 
is treated as a heuristic rather than a general property of 
cognition32--at best a shortcut to rational judgment, at worst an 
interference with it.33  This baseline assumption is problematic.  
It approaches emotion as a suspect category, rather than 
assessing particular emotions and their suitability in context.  
 Current research on emotion and cognition supports a very 
different view.  It views emotion as a source of information in 
its own right; not just a second-best substitute for 
deliberation.  Emotion gives rise to irrationality in some 
circumstances but performs an important role in others.  For 
social and moral judgment, it is an essential source of 
information--one that enables us to perceive and attend to the 
emotions of others and to predict the consequences of our 
actions for others.34  Damasio and other researchers have 
                                                     
31 See, e.g., Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1119. 
32 See Kahan, supra note 1, at 743; Paul Slovic et al., The 
Affect Heuristic, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 4, at 
397-420. 
33 See, e.g., Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1119 n.42. 
34 See, e.g., William D. Casebeer, Moral Cognition and Its Neural 
Constituents, 4 Nature Reviews:  Neuroscience 841, 843-44 (2003) 
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observed that subjects with impaired access to their emotions 
may lose the ability to make decisions beneficial to their well-
being or the welfare of others.35  In addition, emotion helps us 
determine what we value, and what requires our immediate 
attention.  For example, Damasio’s impaired subjects often 
gather information obsessively, performing endless cost-benefit 
analyses, but lose the ability to decide between options.36  Both 
information and affect are essential to judgment. 
 Second, current emotion research views emotion as shaping 
perceptions of fact as well as perceptions of value, and as 
influencing deliberative as well as intuitive reasoning.  The 
initial factual assumptions underlying intuitive processing 
continue to exert a strong influence on the more deliberative 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(discussing “theory of mind” as an essential component of moral 
reasoning).   
35 See Damasio, supra note 9, at 36-37 (discussing Elliot, a 
patient with damage to his prefrontal cortex).  As Damasio 
points out, the particular pathology will depend on the nature 
of the neurological damage at issue.  Id. at 38-39. 
36 See id. at 193 (discussing another patient with damage to his 
prefrontal cortex). 
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processing that follows.37  For example, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the empirical debate about whether the death penalty 
deters crime is unlikely to be resolved no matter how many facts 
are amassed.38  Proponents and opponents begin from different 
assumptions about human behavior.  These assumptions influence 
not only their value judgments about what tradeoffs are 
acceptable but their factual assumptions about how many crimes 
might be deterred.  Unless they come to question their initial 
assumptions--something people rarely do of their own accord--the 
deliberation that follows will simply build upon and reinforce 
those initial assumptions.39
 This dynamic has implications for the question of experts 
that divides Kahan and Sunstein.  If the intuitive process leads 
to errors and distortions, deliberation will not correct these 
                                                     
37 Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of 
Retributive Justice, 41 Advances Experimental Soc. Psychol. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 40-42), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031193. 
38 See generally Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons:  
Examining the Strange Persistence of the American Death Penalty, 
42 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc’y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 16-
18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019615. 
39 Id.  
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errors unless they are brought into consciousness40--and this is 
true for experts as well as laypeople.41  
                                                     
40 Conversely, the intuitive process is more educable than this 
model assumes.  See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the 
Thin Blue Line:  Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision 
To Shoot, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1006, 1007-08 (2007) 
(reporting on the effectiveness of training for eliminating 
racially based aspects of police officers’ split-second 
decisions to shoot). 
41 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the 
Friedmans:  Moral Panic, Institutional Denial and Due Process, 3 
Law, Culture & Human. 293, 302 (2007) (discussing, inter alia, 
the role of child psychology and child abuse experts in 
fomenting moral panic about daycare sexual abuse and satanic 
worship).  For an example of a successful effort to counteract 
bias by bringing it into consciousness, see Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges? 
(Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n 17th Annual Meeting, Working Paper No. 
67, 2007), available at 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/lawpoliticswkshp-
rachlinski.pdf (measuring race and gender bias among trial 
judges and finding that once it is brought into consciousness, 
it can be ameliorated).  
 21
V.  The Construction of Risk 
 Determining what constitutes a risk is not a mechanical 
calculus.  It is a task of identification and definition that 
requires deciding what questions to ask, what temporal and 
causal links to draw,42 what assumptions about “social” or 
“natural” forces to make, and how to fit the answers into a 
coherent narrative amenable to policy recommendations.  In 
short, identifying and delineating risks implicates a cognitive 
process that is both normative and affect laden.  
 In a groundbreaking book on the Chicago heat wave of 1995, 
sociologist Eric Klinenberg illustrates both the crucial 
importance and the limitations of factfinding.43  Klinenberg’s 
“social autopsy” of the Chicago heat wave examines the 739 heat-
related deaths44 that occurred during a six-day period in 
Chicago, and analyzes the factors that made it so difficult for 
                                                     
42 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A 
Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal 
Reasoning and the Law, 359 Phil. Transactions Royal Soc. London 
B 1749, 1751-52 (2004).  
43 Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave:  A Social Autopsy of Disaster in 
Chicago (2002). 
44 “Heat-related” deaths are those that would not have occurred 
but for the heat.  Id. at 29-30. 
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this tragedy to be seen, first, as a unified phenomenon at all, 
and second, as anything other than a natural and inevitable 
disaster.  He concludes that the deaths were the result of a 
complex combination of factors, most of which were man-made and 
therefore susceptible to correction.45   
 The account has much to say about experts and their role in 
risk and disaster assessment.  One of the few heroes of 
Klinenberg’s narrative is an expert:  the Cook County Medical 
Examiner, who, in the face of considerable pressure, insisted on 
establishing and applying the criteria that led to the 
classification of the deaths as “heat related” and made possible 
the identification of a pattern of “excess deaths.”46  Yet the 
most compelling message of the book is that many of the factors 
that caused and defined this disaster did not fall into familiar 
categories of risk or catastrophe and thus failed to register 
with experts or opinion makers.  In part, this was an issue of 
salience, or availability--heat waves simply don’t generate the 
                                                     
45 He describes the crisis and its causes as exemplifying a 
“total social fact, one that integrates and activates a broad 
set of social institutions and generates a series of social 
processes that expose the inner workings of the city.”  Id. at 
32. 
46 Id. at 26-27. 
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tangible physical damage (or the spectacular, camera-ready 
images) that floods, fires and hurricanes do.  But, in addition, 
the social factors that contributed to the mortality rate also 
contributed to the masking of the scope and nature of the 
disaster.  The vast majority of the victims were poor, isolated, 
and “invisible;” that is, off the radar of the general populace 
and the “social scientific experts on disasters.”47  Klinenberg 
notes that 
the methods and theories used in conventional health 
and climate studies deprive scientists of the 
instruments they need to conduct a thorough 
investigation.  There is little in their professional 
tool kit to help explain the social sources of the 
disaster.  Although every major study and report has 
found that medical and meteorological approaches are 
inadequate to explain why so many Chicago residents 
died, no one has analyzed how the city’s social 
environment contributed to the devastation.48  
 As Klinenberg argues, before an unexpected situation can be 
perceived as a disaster or a risk, it needs to fit certain 
frames that prompt certain types of experts to ask--or to be 
                                                     
47 Id. at 17. 
48 Id. at 18. 
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asked--the questions they are used to addressing.  In this case, 
“political officials, journalists, and research scientists 
established the dominant analyses of the heat wave as well as 
the basic categories that organized public discourse about the 
trauma.”49  The result was that the disaster was viewed as a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, perhaps exacerbated by the 
individual fault of the victims’ families or even the victims 
themselves.  The consequence of this construction of events was 
that, for years afterward, experts and government officials saw 
no need to determine how to prevent such a disaster from 
happening again.  
 Even as to more easily recognizable disasters and 
tragedies, affect-laden assumptions about human behavior and 
causality affect risk assessment.  Consider, for example, the 
response to Hurricane Katrina.  What lessons about risk 
regulation can be learned from the facts of the disaster?  
First, we need to decide what in fact went wrong, and what facts 
are relevant to preventing another disaster.  To some, Katrina 
was a natural disaster, or at least a natural disaster in a 
place that is below sea level and therefore never should have 
been settled.  For others, it was a product of humanly 
exacerbated global warming, or of negligence by the Corps of 
                                                     
49 Id. at 23. 
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Engineers, perhaps compounded by various other forms of 
government ineptitude.  Some saw not generalized ineptitude but 
racism.  Others saw an aggregation of poor choices by 
individuals--such as building shoddy homes on low ground or 
failing to implement an exit plan.  There are numerous factual 
issues that are susceptible to measurement imbedded in these 
perceptions. 
 Nevertheless, the larger questions of what caused the 
disaster and how best to prevent the next one require complex 
judgments of fact and value.  Causation is never solely a 
factual calculation--it always requires a standard of proof, a 
decision about the relevance of motive, fault, or 
blameworthiness, and a way of comparing contributory factors.  
Any discussion of solutions will be influenced, in part, by 
evaluative assumptions and biases about who is deserving of aid, 
what is fixable and what is inevitable, which factors are most 
relevant, and who is within our circle of empathy and 
compassion.  
As Klinenberg’s study illustrates, experts as well as 
laypeople will gather and evaluate data in light of implicit 
assumptions about how the world works.  For experts to add value 
to the equation, they need more than just additional data.  They 
need a means of identifying their own background assumptions and 
recognizing the emotional influences that animate them, and a 
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means of splitting off the influences that interfere with sound 
judgment.50  Current research suggests that people are not very 
good at identifying their own fallibilities, and that correction 
is more likely to come from debate with others and exposure to 
differing viewpoints than from continued private deliberation.51
Values and the emotions that animate them should be 
assessed in light of our democratic aspirations.  As political 
scientist Sharon Krause argues, “the ideal of reciprocity . . . 
obligates citizens to justify public decisions in terms that all 
can endorse.”52  “[R]ightly conceived,” this ideal “involves the 
                                                     
50 See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Worst Investors?  Humans, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 29, 2007, at C1 (reviewing Jason Zweig, Your Money 
& Your Brain (2007)) (recounting the difficulties financial 
experts encounter in overriding their emotions to apply their 
own principles of investing).  According to Nocera, Zweig 
believes that experts who succeed in the face of crisis do not 
“ignore their emotions . . .[, but rather] turn them inside out.  
When they feel fear, they don’t act on it.  They examine it.  
They say, what should this feeling tell me?”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
51 See Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 19. 
52 Sharon R. Krause, Public Deliberation, Democratic Politics, 
and the Feeling of Impartiality 2 (Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished 
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communication of appropriate sentiments and an attachment to the 
common, affective concerns that are constitutive of the 
political order.”53
Conclusion 
 Happily, our cognitive apparatus works pretty well for the 
challenges and responsibilities of living in a participatory 
democracy.  Although we all bring emotions, values, and beliefs 
to the table, these components of judgment are shaped and 
refined in a social context.  We are not particularly good at 
identifying and correcting for our own assumptions and biases, 
even when we have ample time and information to deliberate.  The 
better approach to correcting for blind spots and biases, and to 
identifying the emotions that interfere with considered 
judgment, is exposure to differing viewpoints and vigorous 
debate.54  This solution jibes nicely with the requirements of a 
pluralistic democratic process in which values are constantly 
                                                                                                                                                                           
manuscript), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conferen
ce/PublicDeliberation_paper.pdf. 
53 Id. 
54 See Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 37, at 40-41; Haidt & 
Bjorklund, supra note 19. 
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being challenged and shaped, and in which government strives to 
reflect and influence the considered values of the populace. 
 Participatory democracy is both a goal and a process.  Our 
form of government flourishes when its citizens are open to new 
information, can talk across ideological divides, and strive to 
make informed choices.  In this account, values are not static.  
They are formed and continually refined in a societal context.  
They help shape our societal and governmental priorities, and 
these priorities, in turn, help shape our values.  As cognitive 
neuroscience and related disciplines are making increasingly 
clear, this process of defining and acting upon our collective 
values, which is so essential to the working of participatory 
democracy in a heterogeneous and open society, simply could not 
take place without the ability to recognize and evaluate 
emotion. 
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